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Abstract
Protected areas represent a powerful policy tool for the preservation of ecosystems and their
services. The rapid proliferation of protected areas in Bolivia over the past several decades has
prompted interest in understanding their impacts on surrounding populations. Recent studies
from other developing countries show that protected areas have had positive impacts on poverty.
Using rich biophysical and socioeconomic data from Bolivia we find that municipalities with at
least 10% of their area occupied by a protected area established between 1992 and 2000 exhib-
ited differentially greater levels of poverty reduction between 1992 and 2001 compared to similar
municipalities unaffected by protected areas. We find that our results are robust to a number
of econometric specifications, spillover analyses and a placebo study. Although our overarching
results that Bolivia’s protected areas were associated with poverty reduction are similar to pre-
vious studies, our underlying results differ subtly, but significantly. Previous studies found that
controlling for key observable covariates led to fundamentally antithetical results compared to
na¨ıve (uncontrolled) estimates. Conversely, our results indicate that na¨ıve estimates lead to an
over estimation of the poverty reducing impacts of protected areas. Our results expose the het-
erogeneity of protected area impacts across countries and, therefore, underscore the importance
of country-level impact evaluations in order to build the global knowledge base regarding the
socioeconomic impacts of protected areas.
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rics, Bolivia
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1 Introduction
Protected areas are an important tool for the global conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity
(MEA, 2005). Presently, approximately 13% of the world’s terrestrial surface is covered by some
form of protected area (WDPA, 2011). The sheer scale of the global coverage of protected ar-
eas highlights the importance of understanding their underlying impacts. Unfortunately, there is
little empirical evidence on the environmental impacts of protected areas and even less on the
socioeconomic impacts of protected areas on surrounding communities (Coad et al., 2008). The
socioeconomic implications of establishing protected areas are of particular interest given the high
degree of overlap between areas of remaining biodiversity (i.e., areas likely to be targeted for protec-
tion) and poverty (Sachs et al., 2009). This raises concerns from poverty advocates that achieving
environmental goals may come at the expense of the populations impacted by such policy (Coad
et al., 2008; Adams et al., 2004).
The dearth of quality evidence on the impacts of protected areas fuels a general debate regarding
the relationship between areas protected by environmental law and the socioeconomic outcomes in
surrounding areas. Conservationists see the establishment of protected areas as essential to global
environmental stability, whereas poverty advocates argue that, while the benefits from protecting
these areas are paid to all, the costs are borne only by those proximal to the areas (Coad et al.,
2008; Wilkie et al., 2006; Adams et al., 2004). This argument concerns the land-use laws associated
with protected areas that restrict economic development by preventing forms of profitable activities
such as the exploitation of natural resources and agricultural cultivation (Coad et al., 2008; Fleck
et al., 2006).
There have been few empirical studies with the proper data and methodologies to accurately
estimate the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas on local economies, especially in developing
nations (exceptions include: Ferraro and Hanauer (2011); Ferraro et al. (2011); Andam et al.
(2010); Sims (2010); Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt (2010)). Most studies have either been ex ante
estimates of future costs and benefits, or ex post studies of observed states of welfare (Andam
et al., 2010; Wilkie et al., 2006). The ability to empirically measure the socioeconomic impacts of
protected areas is complicated by the non-random nature in which areas are assigned to protection.
The presence of such selection issues necessitates the use of sophisticated research design and
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methodologies, absent most previous studies. Further confounding the process is the fact that
most developing nations do not have sufficiently rich data sets with which to measure pre- and
post-treatment poverty outcomes.1
Bolivia is an apt setting for evaluating the impacts of protected areas on poverty in surrounding
communities. Bolivia is one of the most biodiverse countries in the world.2 Yet despite having a
wealth of natural resources, Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, with poverty
levels upwards of 60% (Canavire-Bacarreza and Mariscal, 2010). Bolivia also has an extensive pro-
tected area network that was made effective by an identifiable restructuring of the existing system
in 1992, followed by a surge in proliferation of new protected areas throughout the 90s. Moreover,
Bolivia has rich biophysical and socioeconomic data that predate the effective establishment of
protected areas.
Using rich biophysical and socioeconomic data, and quasi-experimental methods, we ask, “what
would poverty outcomes in Bolivian communities affected by protected areas have been had pro-
tected areas not been established?” We find no evidence that communities affected by protected
areas established between 1992 and 2000 fared any worse, between 1992 and 2001, than similar
communities that remained unaffected by protected areas. In fact, all of our point estimates indi-
cate that protected communities had differentially greater levels of poverty reduction. We find that
these results are robust to a number of econometric specifications, sensitivity analyses, spillover
analyses and placebo studies. Our results are concordant with findings of poverty alleviation due
to the establishment of protected areas in Costa Rica (Andam et al., 2010) and Thailand (Andam
et al., 2010; Sims, 2010). However, unlike previous studies (Andam et al., 2010; Sims, 2010) our
results indicate that na¨ıve (uncontrolled) comparisons of protected and unprotected communities
leads to an overestimation of the poverty alleviation associated with the establishment of protected
areas. Accordingly, our results underscore the fact that protected area impacts are likely not gener-
1See Ferraro (2008) for a discussion on the components of a quality socioeconomic impact evaluation which include:
1) An appropriate measure of welfare; 2) observations on outcomes and pertinent covariates for both pre- and post-
treatment; 3) relevant indicators for both treatment and control units, and; 4) observations of pretreatment covariates
that affect both selection into treatment and socioeconomic outcomes.
2Bolivia is one of the 15 most biologically diverse countries in the world. It is recognized as one of the 11 nations
with the greatest diversity of flora (about 20 thousand species) and one of the top 10 most abundant in terms of
birds (1,400 species) and mammals (356 species). Information provided by the Protected Areas National Service of
Bolivia SERNAP (2009). Moreover, according to an UNESCO report, Bolivia has the largest water reserves in Latin
America and ranks 6th in the world in terms of tropical moist forest resources (the third in the continent after Brazil
and Mexico).
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alizable and, therefore, the importance of country-level protected area impact evaluations. To that
end, our results add to the scientific body of knowledge on the socioeconomic impacts of protected
areas in developing countries, which is exceedingly sparse.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Protected areas in Bolivia
The evolution of the establishment and enforcement of protected areas in Bolivia is complex but
can be defined, coarsely, by two periods: pre- and post-1992. A non-trivial amount of Bolivia’s
area was designated for protection between the late 30’s and early 90’s.3 However, the criteria for
establishing these areas were not uniform, or systematic. Most were established with little technical
background and absent the participation of local actors (SERNAP, 2007). Furthermore, there was a
lack of recognition and requisite enforcement within these areas, a phenomenon commonly referred
to as, “paper parks” (e.g., Bruner et al. (2001)).
The progression of the theme of conservation and the consequent international commitments
undertaken by countries in the early 90’s, after the Rio Conference, led to the development of
policy and institutional foundations related to the then new paradigm of sustainable development
and environmental care. Thus, under the Environment Law (Law 1333), the National System of
Protected Areas in Bolivia (SNAP) was created in 1992, defined as natural and cultural heritage
of the State and public and social interest.
The Law 1333, defines protected areas in Bolivia as “natural areas with or without human
intervention, declared under state protection by law, in order to protect and preserve the flora
and fauna, genetic resources, natural ecosystems, watersheds and values of scientific, aesthetic,
historical, economic and social interest, in order to conserve and protect natural and cultural
heritage of the country.”4
The consequence of Bolivia’s history of protection and Law 1333 is that, even for areas desig-
3The 10 protected areas that were established prior to the 1990’s cover 5,917,638 ha which is approximately 1/3
of the total protected area.
4One of the most important characteristics of Bolivia’s protected areas is their compatibility with the existence
of traditional indigenous people (Environment Law 1333, Section 60-65). Since its initiation in 1992, the National
System of Protected Areas in Bolivia has been designed with a participatory approach, recognizing that the areas
are occupied and are ancestral territories of indigenous populations. Therefore, the participation of local people is a
fundamental in the main aspect of the system.
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nated prior to 1992, the effective establishment date of Bolivia’s protected area system was 1992
(and thereafter). The identification of this administrative recognition and enforcement allows us to
use 1992 as a baseline, pre-treatment year, after which the intervention impact of protected areas
can be measured.
1.1.2 Related literature
There have been only a handful of studies on the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas that
properly control for their non-random establishment. Further, there is no formal literature regarding
the impacts of Bolivia’s protected area network on socioeconomic outcomes. The closest study to
this kind for Bolivia (Ya´n˜ez, 2006) examines the potential effects of three protected areas on poverty
in Bolivia. Based on household surveys carried out near these protected areas, the author finds a
small positive effect of protected areas on poverty. Nevertheless, this study not only has a small
sample of protected areas, but also presents some methodological drawbacks such as selection bias
and sample selection.
The most comparable study to ours is a quasi-experimental analysis of protected areas in Costa
Rica (Andam et al., 2010). The authors designate census tracts (segmentos) with 10% or more of
their areas protected, as treated. They then use matching techniques to construct a counterfactual
group that is similar along pretreatment dimensions to the treated census tracts. The authors’
calculation of average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) provides evidence that census tracts
with protected areas that were established prior to 1980 had differentially greater levels of poverty
reduction between 1973 and 2000 than comparable unprotected census tracts.
In a similar study Sims (2010) uses a continuous measure of the percent of land area protected
within Thailand sub-districts to measure the marginal effect of protected areas (IUCN category I &
II) on a poverty headcount ratio. The author compiles an extensive set of pre- and post-treatment
biophysical covariates. However, the outcome variable is only available for the contemporaneous
period, therefore, the baseline levels of poverty are unknown. The results of the study show that
when baseline geographic and development variables are controlled for, sub-districts with more
protected area displayed lower poverty levels than comparison districts.
Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt (2010) explore how national parks affect local wages in Costa Rica
and how these effects vary within different areas of a park and among different social groups. They
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use highly disaggregated geographic references, and find that parks’ effects on wages vary according
to economic activity and proximity to the entrance of the park. Workers close to entrances receive
higher wages and are employed in higher-paid, non-agricultural activities.
Several studies from the United States have shown no effect of protected areas on economic
outcomes at the county level. In two studies, (Lewis et al., 2002, 2003) use a simultaneous equations
framework to examine the county level effects of protected areas (publicly owned land designated
for preservation and multiple use) in the Northern Forest Region of the United States on migration,
on employment and wage composition. A broader study by (Duffy-Deno, 1998) uses a cross-section
of intermountain western counties of the United States to determine the effect of protected areas
(Wilderness, Forest Service and BLM land) on population and employment densities. The author
finds no significant effect on either outcome of interest. However, all of these studies suffer from
the lack of a true baseline, given that all of the protected areas were designated decades prior to
the first census observations.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
We employ three categories of spatial and demographic data in this study: (1) temporally distinct
boundary mappings of terrestrial protected areas, (2) boundary mappings of municipalities for the
1992 and 2001 censuses and the underlying demography, and; (3) key biophysical characteristics
believed to jointly affect the establishment of protected areas and poverty.
The 1992 and 2001 census data were obtained from the Bolivian National Statistical Office
(INE). The census provides information that allows us to estimate socioeconomic indicators at
municipal level, such as structural poverty measures, education, employment, housing and health.
Information regarding Bolivia’s protected areas and their boundaries was obtained from Servicio
Nacional de Areas Protegidas (SERNAP) and the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA).
Further geographic data (e.g., road networks, digital elevation models, cities, forest cover, etc.)
were obtained from NASA, Conservation International and Bolivian forest regulation office (Super-
intendencia Forestal).
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2.1.1 Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis for our study is the municipality. The municipality is the penultimate political
boundary in terms of disaggregation, second to the comunidad. Bolivia comprises 327 municipalities
with an average area of 325,083 ha (about the size of Rhode Island; range: 28,928 – 1,298,121 ha).
The maps in Figures 1 and 2 show that the municipalities in the mountainous and altiplano regions
(southwest) tend to be smaller than those in the lowlands (east northeast; see Figure 3 for the
topography of Bolivia).
2.1.2 Protected areas and treatment assignment
Bolivia has 23 protected areas that cover a total area of 17,131,507.48 ha or ∼16 percent of Bolivia’s
terrestrial area (GIS calculations). The average size of a protected area is 475,875 ha (range: 221
– 2,919,143 ha). To determine the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas we must identify
the municipalities that are spatially influenced by protected areas. We use GIS to determine
the proportion (percentage) of each municipality that is occupied by a protected area established
between 1992 and 2000. Of the 87 municipalities that intersect with one or more protected area,
the average area designated as protected is 29.3% (range: 0.00007 – 100%). In order to assign
municipalities a binary indicator of treatment we must establish a threshold (percentage), above
which municipalities are considered protected. Our initial threshold is established at 10%.5 In
order to reduce potential bias to our estimates we need to ensure that we are not comparing
protected municipalities with marginally protected municipalities (doing so would likely serve to
weaken estimates of treatment effect). We, therefore, drop municipalities with percentage overlap
along the interval [0.1, 10). According to our assignment rule, there are 56 municipalities that are
considered protected. The percentage of overlap within these protected municipalities ranges from
10.26 – 100% (mean = 43.9%, median = 39.14%). We are left with 256 municipalities that are
considered unprotected.
5We use the 10% threshold in accordance with previous studies (Andam et al., 2010; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2011;
Ferraro et al., 2011). A 10% threshold was chosen because one the goals of set forth by 4th World Congress on
National Parks and Protected Areas was to protect 10% of the worlds ecosystems (Andam et al., 2010). We test the
robustness of our results to this protection threshold by defining alternative thresholds at 5, 20, 30 and 50%. We find
that our results are robust to these alternative thresholds (see Appendix for full threshold results).
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Figure 1: Map of protected areas, major cities and quintiles of poverty in 1992 according to poverty index.
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2.1.3 Covariates of interest
To isolate the causal effect of protected areas on poverty, we compile a set of observable covariates
that jointly affect the establishment of protected areas and poverty outcomes (and assume that all
unobservables do not exhibit joint influence). These covariates are used in our analyses to control
for the observable differences between protected and unprotected municipalities, therefore, isolating
the impact of protection.
Distance to major city. Cities tend to be the nodes of major markets, economic activity and
opportunity. Protected areas are often located distant from major cities, where the opportunity
cost of land is lower (Sims, 2010; Joppa and Pfaff, 2009). We calculate the average distance from
each municipality to the nearest city (each municipality is broken into 1 ha parcels and the average
euclidean distance from the set of parcels within each municipality to the nearest city is calculated
using GIS). Cities included in the measurement are the state capitals: La Paz (and El Alto), Sucre,
Cochabamba, Cobija, Trinidad, Oruro, Potosi, Tarija and Santa Cruz. Table 1 shows that protected
municipalities are significantly farther from cities, on average, than unprotected municipalities. This
is consistent with previous findings (e.g., Andam et al., 2010; Sims, 2010; Joppa and Pfaff, 2009).
Roadless volume. Access to roads increases access to markets and other resources (reducing
transportation costs, etc.). In addition, roads serve as a good indicator of the level of infrastructure
development and urbanization. Previous country-level studies have found that protected areas tend
to be located in areas with sparse road networks (Andam et al., 2010, 2008). To control for baseline
measures of these influences we calculate roadless volume (Watts et al., 2007). Roadless volume
is an aggregation of the euclidean distance to a road for each land parcel within a municipality,
adjusted for the size of the land parcel. Roadless volume is calculated by summing the product of
the area of each land parcel (1 ha in this case) and the distance of that parcel to the nearest road
(1992). Therefore, higher measurements of roadless volume indicate fewer road networks within a
municipality. Table 1 shows that roadless volume is greater within protected municipalities, which
is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Andam et al., 2010).6
Elevation and slope. Productivity of land, especially related to agricultural productivity,
6One may be concerned that disparate municipality areas across protected and unprotected units might confound
the estimates of protected area impacts (e.g., may be correlated with urbanization or other unobservable). However,
roadless volume is nearly perfectly correlated with the area of respective municipalities (Pearson correlation coefficient
is 0.905), mitigating such concerns.
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Figure 2: Map of protected areas, major cities and quintiles of poverty in 1992 according to NBI.
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plays a large role in economic development. Low slope, low elevation land tends to be more
suitable for agriculture and general development (lower production, extraction and development
costs). Previous studies, both globally (Joppa and Pfaff, 2009) and at the country-level (Andam
et al., 2010; Sims, 2010), have found that protected areas tend to be placed on land that is relatively
steep and at high elevation. It is, therefore, important to control for the average slope and elevation
of municipalities. Bolivia presents somewhat of a unique case, however. Bolivia is characterized by
a dichotomous landscape in that the country is defined (in general) by the highlands and lowlands.
Table 1 shows that the slope in protected municipalities is greater in unprotected municipalities
(expected), however the average elevation is lower (on average) within these protected municipalities
(unexpected).
N
Figure 3: Digital elevation model of Bolivia, with protected areas draped (green). While a majority of the
designated protected areas lie in relatively mountainous regions, there is a large area protected in the east
that accounts for the relatively low average slope of protected municipalities. The red points represent the
location of major cities listed in Figures 1 and 2.
Forest cover. Protected areas tend to be placed on forested lands (Andam et al., 2010; Sims,
2010). In addition, forests represent potential for economic opportunities (timber, fuelwood, etc.).
We therefore calculate the percentage of each municipality covered by forest in 1991. Table 1 shows
that protected municipalities contained significantly more forested areas at baseline.
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2.1.4 Poverty
In order to estimate the impact of protected areas on poverty, an outcome that objectively measures
levels of socioeconomic welfare is necessary. In the absence of a universal metric such as income, we
are tasked with developing metrics that adequately capture socioeconomic outcomes. We employ
two measures of poverty in our analyses: (1) an asset based poverty index (PI), and, (2) Necesidades
Basicas Insatisfechas (NBI). Both poverty indicators are measured during the 1992 and 2001 census
years and serve two purposes. First, the PI and NBI in 2001 serve as the outcome of interest to
measure differences in poverty between protected and unprotected municipalities. Second, the PI
and NBI in 1992 serve as controls for baseline states of poverty. By ensuring that we compare
protected and unprotected municipalities with similar baseline poverty characteristics, we improve
the probability that these units share similar poverty trajectories prior to the establishment of
protected areas.
Table 2: Eigenvectors from principal component analysis
Eigenvectors, Pooled
Variable EigenV
Adult men in population* -0.02836
Households without bathroom* 0.34984
Households that use fuelwood for cooking* 0.39719
Households with dirt floors* 0.39399
Low-quality houses* 0.33074
Households without electricity* 0.46972
Illiterate population* 0.17906
Population employed with salary* -0.06499
Average persons per bedroom 0.00384
Households without access to public water* 0.39091
Households without sewer or septic* 0.20994
Average years of education -0.02452
Notes: Census data from 1992 and 2001 are pooled to measure
average influence of assets across time.
* Indicates that variable is measured as a percentage.
We use two separate measures of poverty to buttress the robustness of our analyses. Although
the PI and NBI are both designed as measures of poverty, they capture different aspects that
contribute to poverty.7
7Given that we do not have a more direct metric for poverty, such as income, we feel that it is important not to
limit our analyses to a single proxy.
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Table 3: Mean Asset Values by Deciles of 1992 Poverty Index
Richer Deciles of PI 1992 Poorer
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
pct.men.92 57.77 55.96 55.78 54.74 54.45 56.5 55.1 54.56 54.3 57.9
pct.wo.bath.92 43.96 66.88 61.13 68.52 77.72 86.13 82.14 85.15 92.49 99.26
pct.fuelwood.92 25.59 46.61 70.06 69.85 65.79 74.67 82.98 89.47 91.4 99.2
pct.dirt.floor.92 28.77 49.74 63.72 72.77 76.89 79.72 80.52 81.61 92.19 91.7
pct.low.qual.house.92 15.23 23.07 37.02 41.09 49.08 47.7 57.57 58.63 68.46 82.57
pct.wo.elct.92 26.35 45.1 63.42 73.31 82.13 86.89 94.17 94.65 97.19 99.87
illit.92 12.5 19.32 23.11 27.04 24.7 33.12 30.24 37.22 47.19 67.91
emp.92 95.8 91.28 90.17 88.66 89.6 88.09 85.62 84.93 81.45 61.62
avg.person.room.92 3.28 3.26 3.48 3.52 3.42 3.34 3.53 3.57 3.77 4.09
pct.nowater.92 27.13 46.12 59.33 69.38 75.83 75.63 77.57 83.98 90.18 97.56
pct.nosewer.92 65.05 87.19 90.97 93.19 96.16 96.98 97.34 98.5 99.03 99.87
avg.edu.92 6.77 5.1 4.66 4.2 4.42 3.68 3.77 3.36 2.72 1.45
Poverty Index (PI).8 Our PI is an asset based poverty index founded on household responses
to the 1992 and 2001 censuses. The index is constructed using a principal component analysis
(PCA). The primary purpose of the PCA is to measure the influence of a vector of variables
on a latent outcome, poverty. The relative influence of each component variable is measured by
the eigenvectors (factor loading) calculated from the variance/covariance matrix underlying the
component variables. The eigenvectors are combined with the relative municipal-level variation in
assets to calculate a municipal-level PI.
Table 2 lists the variables used in the construction of the poverty index, and the eigenvectors
associated with each asset.9 These eigenvectors (from the first component) account for over 60% of
the variation in the asset variables and provide the factor scores Fj for asset j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} which
indicate the weight and direction of the influence each asset aj exerts on the PI. These factor scores
are combined with observed asset levels to formulate the PI for municipality i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} ,
P Ii =
J∑
1
Fj
[
aij − aj
sj
]
, (1)
where aij is the observed level of asset j in municipality i, aj is the mean of asset j across all
municipalities, and sj is the standard deviation of asset j across municipalities. The intuition
underlying our PI is that there are a number of household assets and characteristics that explain
8A similar asset based poverty index was developed for Costa Rica (Andam et al., 2010; Cavatassi et al., 2004)
and used by the Mexican government in the analyses of the PROGRESA program (cited by Cavatassi et al. (2004).
9Our analyses are designed to measure changes in poverty over time. To ensure that our poverty indexes are
comparable across time we pool the asset data from the 1992 and 2001 census data similar to Cavatassi et al. (2004)
(see also (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001)). By pooling the data for the PCA we estimate the mean influence of each
asset across time, allowing the variation in assets between time periods to drive the estimated changes in poverty.
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variation in unobserved poverty outcomes. By understanding of how these assets co-vary (and by
how much), we can infer, from the composition of these assets across municipalities, how relative
poverty levels vary across municipalities.
We confirm the validity of our PI both internally and externally. The factor scores from the
eigenvectors in Table 2 provide evidence that our PI is internally coherent. A positive factor score
indicates that the asset variable contributes (adds) to poverty, and vice versa. The factor score of
each asset variable carries the expected sign.10 We provide further evidence of the internal validity
of our PI in Table 3, in which we list the mean values of each asset within the deciles of the 1992
PI. The trends in asset levels as the PI increases (increasing deciles) are similar to what we would
expect to see as wealth decreases, indicating that the PI is likely capturing poverty. As an external
(to the PI) measure of our poverty index’s validity we measure the correlation between the PI and
NBI. Although the PI and NBI capture different aspects of poverty, the two measures should be
correlated. We find that this is the case, for instance, the correlation between NBI and PI in 2001
is over 0.88.11
NBI. The NBI measures the percentage of the population within a municipality with unsatis-
fied basic human needs. It captures poverty by measuring the goods or services that a household
possesses that are associated with well-being and then comparing these municipality-level values
to a norm (or ideal). The Bolivian NBI was estimated by the INE in coordination with UDAPE.
It comprises a set of factors such as housing, basic services, education and health.12 The housing
component aims to isolate the household environment, in terms of providing protection from the
outdoors and other external factors such as animals and insects that transmit diseases. It also
includes living spaces inside the household in order to consider social environment, privacy and
comfort. The basic services component considers basic sanitation in terms of the need for good
quality water for food and hygiene, and the availability of health services that allow privacy, sanita-
tion and hygiene. In addition, NBI considers energy availability and cooking sources. The education
portion includes the years of schooling, school attainment and literacy. Finally, the health com-
10According to the manner in which the poverty index was constructed, poverty is decreasing in the negative
orthant.
11This correlation can be observed spatially in the maps in Figures 1 and 2.
12The health component of the Bolivian NBI is not fully comparable between censuses as the questions have
changed. However the change has been accepted and approved by the Bolivian government. The full methodology
can be found at http://www.ine.gob.bo/pdf/Metodologias2004/NBI.doc
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ponent relates to the capabilities of people, and good health that allows the proper development
within the social environment.
The individual household components are compared to a norm which is used to determine if
the household’s basic needs are met. The compilation of each equally weighted component allows
for the identification of the poverty condition of each household.13 Accordingly, a higher measure
of the NBI indicates greater poverty within the associated municipality.
2.1.5 Baseline covariate distributions
Previous studies at the global and country level have found significant differences in the biophysical
(Andam et al., 2010; Sims, 2010; Joppa and Pfaff, 2009; Pfaff et al., 2009) and socioeconomic
(Andam et al., 2010) characteristics underlying protected and unprotected areas. The differences
underscore the non-random nature in which protected areas are allocated. Globally it has been
shown that protected areas tend to be located distant from cities (markets) and on agriculturally
unsuitable land (high slope, high elevation), so-called “high and far” or “rocks and ice” bias (Joppa
and Pfaff, 2009). In addition, a similar study in Costa Rica demonstrated that communities affected
by protected areas had significantly higher levels of baseline poverty than unaffected communities
(Andam et al., 2010).
Table 1 shows that Bolivia shares many of the characteristics associated with protected areas
that are observed globally. The geographic characteristics associated with access to markets, in-
frastructure and urbanization differ significantly between protected and unprotected areas. The
average distance to a major city, roadless volume and percent baseline forest cover are greater in
protected municipalities, indicating that protected areas tend to be established in more rural areas.
In addition, it can be seen that one of the primary indicators of agricultural suitability, slope,
is greater (indicating lower suitability) in protected municipalities. However, contrary to global
trends, we observe that the average elevation in protected municipalities is lower than in unpro-
tected municipalities (see Figure 3). Most interesting is the fact that, according to both poverty
13The methods used to formulate the NBI present some limitations related to the weight of the components that
are included in the index. All the factors included have the same weight, in addition, the method require some norms
to which indicators are compared. These norms are, to some extent, arbitrary. Also, a household is considered poor
if at least one of the NBI components are not satisfied. Moreover, NBI does not consider explicitly the demographic
structure of the household and prioritizes the housing indicators. There is one final, practical, limitation: there are
13 municipalities (four of which are considered protected) for which NBI was not calculated in 1992.
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measures, baseline poverty is slightly lower in protected municipalities. This finding is contrary to
findings from Costa Rica (Andam et al., 2010) and common wisdom.
2.2 Methods
The underlying differences in covariate values between protected and unprotected municipalities
underscores the importance of controlling for such differences in the estimation of the impacts of
protected areas. The selection issue that we must address is that protected areas are not established
randomly across the landscape. Non-random allocation leads to the observed imbalance across
these key covariates, that jointly determine selection into protection and socioeconomic outcomes
(see Table 1), which may lead to biased estimates of the impacts of protected areas under na¨ıve
comparisons of protected and unprotected municipalities. To reduce the bias associated with our
estimates of the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas, we use matching as our primary strategy
to control for this confounding imbalance.
2.2.1 Matching
To measure the impact of protected areas on poverty in surrounding municipalities we use matching
to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Estimation of the ATT is implied
in our research question, “what would poverty outcomes in protected municipalities have been had
they not been protected?” Answering such a question requires the estimation of a counterfactual,
and because there are municipalities for which it is implausible to suppose the establishment of a
protected area, the estimation of an ATT is most appropriate.14
The key to matching as an identification strategy to estimate ATT is the balancing of covariate
distributions across treatment arms (protected and unprotected) thus mimicking the identification
strategy of a randomized experiment. This covariate balance is achieved in expectation through
randomization. Covariate balance is implicit under randomization because each unit of the ex-
perimental sample has an equal probability (or more generally, a probability that is known to
the experimenter) of being assigned to treatment or control. Therefore, treatment is assigned in-
dependent of potential outcomes Y (1) and Y (0) under treatment (T = 1) and control (T = 0),
14Estimation of average treatment effects (ATE), for instance, entails the estimation of an additional counterfactual:
outcomes for all unprotected units had they been protected. We argue that it is implausible for many of Bolivia’s
municipalities to have been protected and, therefore, the estimation of ATT is more appropriate that ATE.
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respectively. In the absence of a treatment, one would expect similar average outcomes from both
groups. Similarly, if both groups were to receive (the same) treatment, one would expect similar
average outcomes from both groups. In the statistics, epidemiology and social science literature this
assumption is termed ignorability of treatment, independence of treatment or unconfoundedness.
Stated formally,
E[Y (1)|T = 1)] = E[Y (1)|T = 0)] = E[Y (1)] (2)
E[Y (0)|T = 1)] = E[Y (0)|T = 0)] = E[Y (0)] . (3)
In words, (2) simply states that average potential outcome for the treatment group under
treatment, E[Y (1)|T = 1)], is equal to the average potential outcome of the control group had they
been treated, E[Y (1)|T = 0)]. Similarly, (3) states that the average potential outcome for the treated
group had they not been treated, E[Y (0)|T = 1)], is equal to the average potential outcome of the
control group in the absence of treatment, E[Y (0)|T = 0)]. In (2) and (3), the terms E[Y (1)|T = 0)]
and E[Y (0)|T = 1)] are termed counterfactual outcomes. The fundamental problem for causal
inference (Holland, 1986) is the fact that counterfactual outcomes are not observed. However, with
treatment assigned at random (and thus independent of potential outcomes), the average outcome
for control units can act as the counterfactual for treatment units, and vice versa.
Protected areas in Bolivia were not established randomly. Matching seeks to mimic the identifi-
cation of randomization by balancing key covariates that jointly determine selection into treatment
and outcomes. Balance, conditional on key covariates, leads to conditional ignorability or condi-
tional independence. However, because our primary estimand of interest is the ATT we only need
to estimate one counterfactual. Therefore, it is only necessary for us to invoke the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) for (2). This more restrictive assumption can be stated formally
as the analog to (2),
E[Y (0)|T = 1, X] = E[Y (0)|T = 0, X)] = E[Y (0)|X] . (4)
Equation (4) states that, conditional on similar covariate distributions across treatment arms,
the average outcomes for the matched control units, E[Y (0)|X,T = 0)], can be used as the coun-
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terfactual for treatment units. In other words, by ensuring that the distributions of key covariates
are balanced across treatment and control groups, similar methods to those used in randomized
experiments can be used to estimate ATT on matched datasets.15 By ensuring that units are
comparable across treatment and control groups, we make the CIA, which is necessary for causal
inference, more defensible (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
2.2.2 Primary estimator
There are many matching metrics from which to choose. Our final specification is determined by
the metric that provides the best balance across our covariates of interest.16 We find that, given
our relatively small sample size, genetic matching provides the best balance and, therefore, is most
likely to satisfy the CIA. Genetic matching (Sekhon, 2007) conducts an algorithmic search across
potential weighting matrices in order to optimize the weighting matrix to best satisfy covariate
balance. We conduct a series of robustness checks on the estimates stemming from the genetic
matching, including adding calipers, calculating the Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum, 2002), and
various regression based estimators (see the Robustness Section below).
Our primary genetic matching specification uses the single nearest neighbor (in terms of covari-
ate distribution) to each treated unit to act as the counterfactual for each treated unit. We allow for
replacement (which generally reduces bias but can increase the variance (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002)) during matching, use a post-match regression bias-adjustment
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Abadie et al., 2004),17 and calculate
so-called Abadie and Imbens (2006) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Our matching spec-
ification seeks to find an unprotected municipality that is observably similar to each protected
municipality, isolating the only remaining variation between treatment arms to be the establish-
ment of protected areas, thereby allowing the unbiased estimation of ATT.
15Similarly, by additionally invoking CIA for equation (3) (i.e., E[Y (1)|T = 1, X] = E[Y (1)|T = 0, X)] =
E[Y (1)|X]), average treatment effects can be measured.
16During the process of selecting a matching metric we tested the balancing properties of many different metrics
(e.g., Mahalanobis, propensity score and inverse covariance). Outcomes and ATT estimates were omitted while
inspecting balance across different specifications to prevent the estimates from potentially affecting the selection of a
metric.
17Because our matched samples are relatively balanced, the post-match regression bias adjustment has relatively
little effect on the point estimates.
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3 Results
3.1 Primary Results
Figure 4 and Table 4 present the results from our primary, and ancillary robustness, analyses (Tables
5 and 6 provide balancing results from our primary matching specifications). In this subsection we
focus on the second column of the respective right, and left, hand bar charts and the respective
row in Table 4, which present the ATT estimates stemming from the genetic matching algorithm.
For both our PI and NBI poverty indicators we find no evidence to suggest that the establish-
ment of protected areas in Bolivia had deleterious effects on poverty. To the contrary, all of our
point estimates indicate that protected areas were likely associated with poverty alleviation. In
other words, after controlling for covariates that jointly influence the establishment of protected
areas and poverty, we find that there was differentially greater poverty reduction between 1992 and
2001 in municipalities that had at least 10% of their area occupied by a protected area. The point
estimates from the primary specification are statistically significant (at any standard level) when
the PI is used as the outcome of interest, but is insignificant when NBI is used as the outcome of
interest (though the point estimates are concordant with those of the PI).
An attractive feature of our matching-based estimator is its transparency in terms of allowing
for the identification of mean poverty outcomes across treatment arms of the matched sample, which
represent the components of the ATT. Table 4 highlights the underlying difference between the na¨ıve
and genetic matching estimates, which stem from the formulation of the counterfactual sample.
When the counterfactual comprises all unprotected municipalities other than those marginally
protected, the counterfactual poverty outcome (the poverty level that would have been observed in
protected municipalities, had they not been protected) is -0.451 (85.61) according to the PI (NBI).
Under our genetic matching specification we are left with 56 and 53 counterfactual unprotected
municipalities for the PI and NBI analyses, respectively (41 and 38 of which are unique in the
respective analyses). The associated counterfactual outcome estimates are more similar to the
treated sample (-0.805 for the PI and 84.16 for NBI), resulting in a more modest estimate of the
poverty reduction associated with the establishment of protected areas for both poverty metrics.
Our results are concordant with previous studies from Costa Rica (Andam et al., 2010) and
Thailand (Andam et al., 2010; Sims, 2010): protected areas are associated with poverty reduction.
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However, our results differ fundamentally from these previous studies. Andam et al. (2010) and
Sims (2010) find that na¨ıve estimates of protected area impacts indicate that protected areas
exacerbated poverty. When key covariates are controlled for, however, their results reverse. In
contrast, our results indicate that a failure to control for key covariates leads to the over estimation
of the impacts of protected areas on poverty reduction.
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Figure 4: Primary estimates of the impacts of protected areas on poverty in Bolivia. The left hand (right
hand) group of bars represent the impact according to poverty index (NBI) across a number of econometric
specifications. The results from the primary genetic matching specification described in Methods can be
found in the second bar of the respective bar groups. The whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval for
the corresponding point estimates underlying each bar.
3.2 Robustness
We test the robustness of our primary estimates in several ways. First, we test the sensitivity
of our matching estimator to unobserved heterogeneity between protected and unprotected units.
The purpose is to identify by how much the groups would have to differ (unobservably) in order to
nullify our results of statistically significant poverty reduction. Second, we test the robustness of
our matching specifications by comparing our primary specification to a number of matching- and
regression-based econometric specifications.
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3.2.1 Internal robustness of matching specification
In any observational study it must be acknowledged that the ability to eliminate bias associated
with non-random selection is limited by one’s understanding of the underlying selection process
(Meyer, 1995), moreover, from a practical standpoint, by the pertinent characteristics of selection
that one can actually observe and obtain. If the selection process and outcomes are systematically
determined only by observable characteristics (for which one controls) then a treatment effect es-
timate derived from a matching algorithm that provides balance will be unbiased and consistent.
However, if there are unobservable characteristics that are uncorrelated with observable charac-
teristics for which we control but also contribute to determining selection and outcomes, then
treatment effect estimates, even for a well balanced matched sample, may be biased. We believe
our data are rich enough to provide sufficient covariates with which to control, therefore mitigating
unobserved heterogeneity. However, we test the sensitivity of our ATT estimates to unobserved
heterogeneity/bias using Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum, 2002).
The Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis measures the amount of unobserved heterogeneity
necessary to undermine the statistical results from our matching process. If a great (small) amount
of unobserved heterogeneity is necessary to weaken the significance of our results then the results are
relatively robust (sensitive).18 Table 7 indicates the level of unobserved heterogeneity (unaccounted
for in our matching process) that would be necessary to nullify our findings of statistically significant
poverty reduction according to the PI. Our results are robust (at the 5% level) to unobserved
heterogeneity that affects the odds of selection into protection by a factor of 2.3. In other words,
these results are highly robust to potential unobserved bias.
3.2.2 Robustness of matching specification to alternative econometric specifications
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of econometric specification, we conduct
a series of ancillary matching- and regression-based analyses. The results of these analyses can be
found in Figure 4 and Table 4.
Genetic matching with calipers. In our primary econometric specification we use one-to-
one nearest neighbor matching based on the genetic matching algorithm. Although we achieve a
18See Appendix for full details on Rosenbaum bounds.
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high level of balance across treatment arms, there are invariably a number of treated units that
do not obtain a well-matched control/counterfactual unit. To ensure that a few poorly matched
units are not biasing or driving the results, we impose calipers, equal to one standard deviation, on
our primary matching specification. In other words, we use the identical genetic weighting matrix,
however, we remove from the sample any matched pair that differ by more than one standard
deviation across covariate values.19
Table 4: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.33 -0.451 -0.838 76.7 85.61 -8.92
in Means [56] [268] {0.014} [53] [242] {0.005}
Regression on Raw NA NA -0.502 NA NA -5.52
Data [56] [268] (0.98) [53] [258] (1.17)
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.535 NA NA -5.62
Marginal [56] [252] (0.099) [53] [242] (1.2)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.494 NA NA -2.63
Weighted Regression [56] [41] (0.106) [53] [45] (1.7)
Genetic Matching -1.33 -0.805 -0.525 76.18 81.16 -4.99
[56] [56] (0.142) [53] [53] (3.67)
Genetic Matching, -1.07 -0.511 -0.56 79.04 81.51 -2.47
Calipers=1sd [49] [49] (0.147) [47] [47] (1.55)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
Figure 4 and Table 4 show that the results for the PI are relatively robust to the introduction
of calipers, i.e., there is only a marginal absolute increase in the point estimate of ATT. Seven pro-
tected municipalities are dropped from the analysis, resulting in a bilateral increase in PI outcomes
across matched protected and unprotected municipalities (from -1.33 to -1.07 and -0.805 to -0.511,
respectively). The variance of the resulting ATT changes little and the point estimate is significant
at any conventional level.
Results for NBI are not as robust. Six protected municipalities are dropped from the sample
resulting in an absolute reduction in the ATT from -4.99 to -2.47. Table 4 indicates that this change
is due to opposite movements in average poverty across the protected and unprotected samples.
19The variance is measured according to the scalar value assigned to each unit after taking the product of the
covariate values of each unit and the genetic weighting matrix. This scalar, like a propensity score, mitigates the
so-called curse of dimensionality associated with multivariate matching.
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Average NBI in protected municipalities increased from 76.18 to 79.04 while average NBI in un-
protected municipalities decreased from 84.16 to 81.51. Although the variance in ATT decreases
after calipers are imposed, the resulting ATT estimate remains insignificant at conventional levels.
Regression-based specifications. We run several regression-based econometric specifications
to ensure that our results are not driven by the use of a matching-based estimator. The results
of these specifications are found in Table 4 (see Appendix Table A15 for full regression results)
and we highlight these specifications in last two columns of each bar group of Figure 4. Although
there is slightly greater heterogeneity in the specifications for which NBI is the outcome, the central
results from these specifications are that: (1) protected areas are associated with significant poverty
reductions according to both the PI and NBI, and; (2) the results do not differ significantly from
the primary matching-based estimates.
Table 5: Balance Results for Primary GenMatch Specification- PI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.‡ Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.267 0.744 -0.477 0.141 0.436
1992 Matched 0.267 0.319 -0.052 0.015 0.164 89.12%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.485 0.194 0.291 0.476 0.292
Matched 0.485 0.466 0.019 0.029 0.037 93.40%
Distance to Unmatched 142800 108000 34790 0.173 35950
Major City Matched 142800 136600 6151 0.029 32940 82.32%
Average Unmatched 1825 2713 -888 0.307 884
Elevation Matched 1825 1794 30.94 0.011 118.9 96.52%
Average Slope Unmatched 23.89 18.97 4.922 0.162 5.34
Matched 23.89 23.89 0.004 0.000 1.628 99.92%
Roadless Unmatched 2.98E+14 8.35E+13 2.14E+14 0.194 1.96E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 2.98E+14 2.53E+14 4.53E+13 0.030 1.27E+14 78.89%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
Bar columns 4 and 5 of each bar group in Figure 4 present the results of a standard regression
(marginally protected units are dropped from the sample and all covariates are included as controls),
and a post-match frequency weighted regression,20 respectively.
Both the regression-based analyses for which the PI is the outcome of interest (bars 4 and 5 on
20The post-match frequency weight regression is conducted on the resulting matched sample from the primary
genetic matching specification. To correct for potential overstatement in the precision of coefficient estimates (due to
repeat matched unprotected observations) we drop all duplicate observations from the unprotected sample and then
weight each unprotected unit by the number of times it was used as a match for a protected unit, to ensure unbiased
coefficient estimates. This so-called “double robust” estimation strategy is promoted by Ho et al. (2007) because the
second stage regression helps to eliminate any residual differences across treatment arms that remain after matching.
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Table 6: Balance Results for Primary GenMatch Specification- NBI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.‡ Mean Diff.
NBI 1992 Unmatched 87.52 91.05 -3.527 0.078 3.15
Matched 87.52 87.56 -0.044 0.001 0.97 98.74%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.464 0.187 0.277 0.453 0.277
Matched 0.464 0.459 0.005 0.007 0.03 98.22%
Distance to Unmatched 136400 108600 27790 0.140 29580
Major City Matched 136400 132600 3730 0.017 25160 86.58%
Average Unmatched 1888 2751 -863.1 0.299 862.8
Elevation Matched 1888 1884 4.489 0.002 106.7 99.48%
Average Slope Unmatched 24.01 19.45 4.555 0.149 5.055
Matched 24.01 23.67 0.334 0.010 3.979 92.66%
Roadless Unmatched 3.06E+14 8.53E+13 2.20E+14 0.195 1.99E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 3.06E+14 2.58E+14 4.80E+13 0.033 1.06E+14 78.22%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
the left hand side of Figure 4) return estimates that are strikingly similar to one another, and to the
primary matching specification. The confidence intervals are slightly tighter than those from the
matching based estimators (expected given the efficiency properties of OLS and the fact that the
standard specification contains a larger sample of unprotected units). There is more heterogeneity in
the impact estimates in which NBI is the outcome of interest. However, one of the more interesting
results from the NBI regression specifications is that, although the estimated impacts of protected
areas on poverty do not differ significantly from the primary matching specification, the impacts of
protected areas on NBI are all significantly different from zero.
3.3 Results Summary
The central finding in our results is that it does not appear as if Bolivia’s protected areas that were
established between 1992 and 2000 had any negative effect on poverty in surrounding communities
between 1992 and 2001. Rather, our results indicate that protected areas were likely associated
with reductions in poverty. Though these results are relatively robust across specifications, a couple
of questions linger.
3.3.1 Effect Size of Impacts
To measure poverty, and changes therein, we use two metrics that are neither directly compara-
ble to one another nor standard measures (e.g., income). It is, therefore, difficult to interpreter
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whether or not the estimated socioeconomic impacts that we report are consistent across metrics,
or economically interesting in terms of magnitude. We calculate the effect size (Cohen, 1988) for
each of our primary impact estimates to overcome the non-comparability of our poverty metrics.
To calculate the effect size of our ATT estimates, we divide the respective estimates by the
standard deviation of the matched unprotected units from the respective analyses. The effect size
is, therefore, a standardized measure of by how much the distribution of the treatment group differs
from that of the control group. The effect size estimates from our primary PI and NBI analyses
are both -0.25. This can be interpreted as follows: protected municipalities had, on average, 0.25
standard deviations lower PI and NBI than the associated matched controls.21 According to Cohen
(1988) this is a relatively small effect size; non-trivial, however.
Another benefit of calculating the effect size is that it allows us to draw comparison between
our results and those of similar studies. Andam et al. (2010) make effect size calculations for there
estimates of the poverty alleviating impacts of protected areas in Costa Rica and Thailand. There
estimates fall on either side of ours at -0.2 and -0.43 for Costa Rica and Thailand, respectively.
3.3.2 PI or NBI?
Although the point estimates in all the primary and ancillary analyses indicate poverty reductions
associated with protected areas, the results from analyses in which the PI is the outcome of interest
are more consistent, and remain statistically significant. This begs the question, in which poverty
measure we should place more stock? From a policy standpoint we argue that it matters little.
There is no evidence that protected areas exacerbated poverty, by any measure. From a technical
standpoint, however, we believe that the PI is more appropriate in our study.
The NBI has some technical and practical shortcomings, mentioned previously. First, the NBI
weights all socioeconomic components equally, unlike the PI in which weights are determined em-
pirically via the PCA. Second, the NBI measures the percentage of households that lie below a norm
which is (somewhat) arbitrarily established. The PI, on the other hand, is based on deviations from
municipality-level means (in either direction). Finally, and from a practical standpoint, analyses in
which the NBI is used are limited by the fact that we do not have baseline NBI measurement for
21Another way to intemperate this effect size measurement would be that approximately 60% of the protected
municipalities had lower PI and NBI measures than the matched controls.
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14 municipalities (four of which are considered protected).
3.3.3 Why are the matching-based and regression-based estimates so similar?
The goals of matching and regression in causal analysis are the same: achieve plausible conditional
independence of the treatment. However, the two methods go about doing so in different manners.
Regression isolates the causal effect of a treatment by imposing a functional relationship between
treatment, covariates and outcome. Regression then isolates the causal effect of treatment by
partialing out the effects of the covariates of interest. Instead of controlling for the differences
across treatment arms via the imposition of a functional form, matching uses a weighting scheme22
to create balance in expectation across the covariates, thereby “controlling” for their influence.
Typically in an analysis in which the ATT is the estimand of interest we would expect greater
differences in matching- and regression-based results. The reason relates to the idea of propensity
for treatment. In a study like ours, where there are control units that would never plausibly be
treated, the overlap in propensity for treatment is generally sparse (or completely lacking) at the
tails of the distributions (of propensity scores and the underlying covariates) between protected
and unprotected units. This scenario can lead to bias in regression results because the coefficient
estimates can be heavily (and inappropriately) influenced by outlying control units (e.g., Ho et al.
(2007)).
The reason that our results are so similar across matching- and regression-based estimates can
be seen in Figure A2. We plot the distributions of propensity scores across treatment arms for pre-
and post-matched samples. It can be seen that there is a high degree of overlap across the range of
propensity scores even prior to matching (left panel of Figure A2). Therefore, it makes sense that
the matching- and regression-based results are comparable because, even within the full sample,
the regression results are not plagued by “out of sample” predictions.
22For example, with one-to-one matching without replacement, control units are excluded from the sample by
receiving an effective weight of 0 whereas remaining units receive a weight of 1.
27
Table 7: Rosenbaum Upper Bound on P-Value at Given Levels of Γ for Primary Matching Analysis- PI
Upper Bound
Γ P-value
1 0
1.1 0.0001
1.2 0.0003
1.3 0.0007
1.4 0.0015
1.5 0.0029
1.6 0.005
1.7 0.0081
1.8 0.0124
1.9 0.018
2 0.0253
2.1 0.0342
2.2 0.0448
2.3 0.0572
4 Discussion
Protected areas have played an increasingly important role in the global conservation of biodiversity
and ecosystem services over the past several decades. However, there is little empirical evidence
of the environmental impacts of protected areas and even less evidence of their socioeconomic
impacts on surrounding communities. Given the high degree of overlap between remaining global
biodiversity and poverty, it is of paramount importance to understand how the establishment of
protected areas impacts poverty.
We use rich biophysical and socioeconomic data, and a myriad of econometric specifications to
estimate the impact of protected areas established in Bolivia between 1992 and 2000 on poverty
between 1992 and 2001. Contrary to the concerns of poverty advocates, that the land-use restric-
tions associated with protected areas impart economic hardship on surrounding communities, our
results do not indicate that protected municipalities were adversely affected by the establishment
of protected areas. In fact, we find evidence that municipalities with at least 10% of their areas
occupied by a protected area had differentially greater poverty reduction than those unaffected by
protected areas. We employ two separate measures of poverty in our analyses and find that the
point estimates of poverty reduction are robust across our econometric specification.
Although our overarching results that Bolivia’s protected areas were associated with poverty
reduction are similar to previous studies from Costa Rica (Andam et al., 2010) and Thailand (An-
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dam et al., 2010; Sims, 2010), our underlying results differ subtly, but significantly. In those studies
the authors found that controlling for key observable covariates lead to fundamentally antithetical
results compared to na¨ıve estimates. Conversely, our results indicate that na¨ıve estimates lead to
an over estimation of the poverty reducing impacts of protected areas.
The implications of our results are twofold. First, our results add to a growing body of literature
on the impacts of protected ares on poverty. More importantly our findings add support to this
literature that environmental conservation policies do not necessarily run in opposition to develop-
ment goals. On the contrary, our results indicate that environmental goals can be complementary
to social poverty goals. Second, our results underscore the importance of country-level analyses of
the socioeconomic impacts of protected areas. Protected areas in Bolivia exhibit many of the char-
acteristics observed globally (i.e., located relatively distant from major cities, roads and on steeper
slopes), however, some of the key drivers of poverty differ in important ways from global and pre-
vious country-level observations. Importantly, we key find differences from previous country-level
and global studies which indicate that evidence from single country or global studies are likely not
generalizable across countries.
The fact that our results exhibit subtle differences to previous results implies that the external
validity of our, and other studies of this ilk, is likely limited. Indeed, we believe that comprehensive
understanding of the socioeconomic impacts for protected areas requires that the scientific body of
knowledge be built on a country-by-country basis.
Further studies in Bolivia and elsewhere should strive to identify and quantify the mechanisms
through which protected areas affect poverty (e.g., Hanauer (2011); Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt
(2010)). Although studies such as ours are important for building an understanding of the global
impacts of protected areas, only by understanding how protected areas affect poverty (especially
in terms of alleviating poverty) can social policies be designed to enhance (mitigate) the positive
(negative) impacts of protected areas. In addition, because the theme of protection in Bolivia
has been toward integrated management and recognition of indigenous populations, future studies
should account for differences in protected area management practices and baseline populations.
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A Appendix
A.1 Threshold Analyses
In our primary specifications we designate a municipality as protected if at least 10% of its area is
occupied by a protected area. A 10% protection threshold is in line with the goals set forth at the
4th World Congress on National Parks and Protected areas (Andam et al., 2010)23 and previous
studies (Andam et al., 2010; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011). However, it could be
argued that this threshold is somewhat arbitrary. We, therefore, test the robustness of our results
to changes in this threshold assignment.
Table A1 provides comparisons of ATT for the primary genetic matching specification at the
5%, 10% (primary specification in main analysis), 20%, 30% and 50% protection thresholds for both
PI and NBI (Tables A2-A5 provide full results for all protection thresholds). Table A1 shows that
as the protection threshold increases, i.e., as we increase the protected area land coverage required
for a municipality to be considered protected, the number of protected municipalities drops (as
expected). In the final 50% threshold specification, only 18 (17) treated units remain in the PI
(NBI) analyses.
In the PI analyses we find that the ATT remains relatively stable, and statistically significant,
across the range of protection thresholds. The mean outcomes for treated and control groups jumps
up (in absolute terms) at the 50% threshold providing indication that there is somewhat lower
poverty within municipalities with greater area protected (note that their matched counterparts
have relatively low average poverty levels as well). We see a similar phenomenon in the NBI
analyses in Table A1. The lowest average poverty outcomes (for protected and matched unprotected
units) are observed at the highest levels of protection. The ATT according to NBI is increasing
monotonically (in absolute terms) with percent protection, however none of the estimates are
significant at the 5% level (the 50% threshold specification is significant at the 10% level).
The results in Tables A1-A5 provide evidence that our primary results are not driven by the
choice of threshold. Rather, our results are robust and consistent across protection threshold
specifications.
23As mentioned in the main text, one of the goals set forth by the 4th World Congress on National Parks and
Protected areas was to protect 10% of the earth’s ecosystems by the year 2000.
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A.2 Placebo Analysis
In our main and ancillary analyses we show that the estimated poverty alleviation associated
with the establishment of protected areas is robust to a number of econometric specifications and
ancillary analyses. However, there is always the concern that the difference in outcomes between
protected and unprotected municipalities stems from our inability to select a control group that
closely enough resembles the protected group.24 To address this potential confounding issue we
perform a placebo analysis.
The goal is to see if our covariates of interest perform well in the construction of a counter-
factual for municipalities that are observably similar (on average) to protected municipalities, but
were never protected. In other words, to see if the gap in poverty outcomes between protected and
unprotected groups was due to something other than protection. If protection was the only remain-
ing source of variation across treatment arms (to which the treatment effect can be attributed) in
our main analyses, then we should observe no difference in expected outcomes between the placebo
group and its matched controls (i.e., our covariates are creating a quality counterfactual).
We proceed by selecting a placebo group that is observably similar to the original protected
group. We then run the same genetic matching specification, assigning the placebo group as
the “treated” group, as in the primary matching analysis. The placebo group in this analysis
comprises the 56 matched controls from the primary genetic matching analysis in the main text.25
This group is observably similar to the original protected group (on average; see Table 5) with the
exception that the placebo group was not affected by protected areas. Therefore, if our covariates
are capturing underlying poverty trajectories well, then by selecting unprotected municipalities that
are observably similar to our placebo group, we should observe no difference in outcomes because
there is no longer protection as a source of variation between the two groups.
The results in Table A6, for both the full and unique placebo groups, indicate that there is no
placebo effect. In other words, our covariates of interest appear to be predicting poverty trajectories
well (see Tables A7 and A8 for balance results). These results buttress our claims that the treatment
24This concern is unlikely true given the high degree of balance across treatment arms in Tables 1and 6.
25Recall that matching was performed with replacement so the placebo group has 15 repeat observations. We choose
this for our primary placebo group because it most closely resembles our original protected group in expectation.
We perform an additional analysis assigning only unique matched controls, from the original analysis, to the placebo
group (see Table A7).
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effects present in our main analyses are due to the establishment of protected areas rather than an
inability to estimate quality counterfactuals.
A.3 Spillover Analysis
The central result from our main analyses is that municipalities that were affected by protected
areas had differentially greater poverty reduction than comparable municipalities that were unaf-
fected by protected areas. An often voiced concern is that protected areas, rather than having a
positive impact of proximal populations, caused those most negatively impacted to emigrate from
the impacted communities, thus leading to positive impact estimates. If such emigration was un-
dertaken by relatively poor populations (a supposition supported by Robalino, 2007) it would have
two effects. First, the departure of a relatively poor population would result in a decrease in the
measured average poverty level within protected municipalities. Second, immigration of these rel-
atively poor populations would increase average poverty measured in surrounding municipalities.
The former affect is a concern because it implies that there were no truly positive mechanisms
through which protected areas affected poverty (e.g., tourism, infrastructure development, ecosys-
tem services, etc.). Instead, the former implies that the establishment of protected areas didn’t
make surrounding populations better-off, it just compelled those that they made the worst-off, to
emigrate. In conjunction, such a scenario would lead to erroneous estimates of poverty alleviation
associated with the establishment of protected areas. To test for this potential false identification
we first assume that if the poor are negatively affected by protected areas, they will migrate to the
nearest unaffected municipalities.
Our analysis to test local migration effects is thus framed as a spillover analysis. Using GIS we
select all the municipalities that neighbor (congruent to) municipalities with at least 10% of their
area occupied by a protected area (see Figure A1). If protected areas caused poor populations
to migrate to surrounding municipalities, then we would expect an increase in poverty between
1992 and 2001 in these neighboring municipalities, compared to observably similar (unprotected)
municipalities. To test this hypothesis we treat the 99 neighboring municipalities26 as ”treated”
units and match them to observably similar unprotected municipalities (according to our covariates
26There are 116 municipalities that are congruent to a protected municipality. 17 are dropped from the sample
because they are considered marginally protected.
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of interest). Under the null hypothesis of no spillover, there should be no treatment effect in the
resulting matched sample. In other words, there should be no difference in poverty outcomes
between congruent (to protected municipalities) and matched unprotected municipalities.
We run our primary genetic matching and regression specifications on the spillover data, the
results of which can be found in Table A9 (see Tables A10 and A11 for balance results). We find no
evidence of negative spillover effects from protected municipalities into congruent municipalities.
For both specifications in which we designate the PI as the outcome, the estimated impacts are quite
small and statistically insignificant. In the specifications using NBI, we find estimates of poverty
alleviation in congruent municipalities (compared to similar unprotected municipalities). These
results are statistically significant (insignificant) in the regression (genetic matching) specification.
The results from our spillover analysis indicate that municipalities congruent to protected mu-
nicipalities fared no worse (and by most indications, better) than similar unprotected municipalities.
We, therefore, propose that the positive poverty impacts associated with the establishment of pro-
tected areas are unlikely due to the emigration of poor populations to surrounding communities.
While this proposition may hold for our regional spillover analysis, it is difficult to test for broader
general equilibrium migration effects.
One final piece of evidence that indicates our results are unlikely driven by complex migration
patterns comes from the preceding placebo analysis. Aside from localized (congruent) migration, it
is not illogical to presume that adversely affected poor populations might migrate to municipalities
that are observably similar to the protected municipalities from which they originate. Under this
scenario we might reasonably assume that poor populations would migrate to the unprotected
municipalities found in the matched control group from the primary genetic matching specification.
However, these are the municipalities that compose our “treated” placebo group, for which we found
no difference in poverty outcomes (compared to similar unprotected municipalities) in the placebo
analysis. If our more complex migration scenario were occurring, we would expect to find a negative
(poverty exacerbation) treatment effect in the placebo analysis.
Unfortunately it is not possible to fully capture all the potential general equilibrium poverty
effects of protected areas. However, given the limited mobility of poor populations and migration
scenarios explored, we believe that our analyses provide strong evidence that the positive impacts
of protected areas are not driven by the emigration of poor populations.
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A.4 Areas Formally Protected in the 1990s
Fundamental to our identification of the impacts of protected areas in our study period was Law
1333 and the associated restructuring and enforcement or protected areas subsequent to 1992.
Despite the evidence of that protected areas were so-called “paper parks” (e.g., (Bruner et al.,
2001)), if the 10 protected areas that were established prior to our study period were in fact
effective, this may be biasing our results.
There are a number of plausible impacts to our results that stem from including protected areas
established (and maintained effectively) prior to our study period. However, our primary concern
is that such inclusion would significantly increase the probability of inferring poverty alleviation
associated with the establishment of protected areas. To address this potential bias, we drop the
10 protected areas that were originally established prior to our study period. We are left with 32
(30) protected municipalities when the PI (NBI) is used as the outcome of interest. We run our
primary specifications on this sample and find the results to be strikingly similar to those from the
original sample (see Table A12 for results and Tables A113 and A14 for balance results).
A.5 Rosenbaum Bounds
The ATT estimates from the primary genetic matching specifications represent unbiased estimates
of the impact of protected areas on poverty under the assumption that we have sufficiently con-
trolled for all covariates that jointly determine the spatial establishment of protection and poverty
(conditional independence assumption). However, if there exists an unobserved covariate or group
of covariates, that is highly correlated with protection and poverty, and uncorrelated with the co-
variates for which we do control, then we may be concerned that this confounder might be biasing
our results. The fundamental concern is that the poverty alleviation observed in protected munic-
ipalities is due to systematic differences between protected and unprotected municipalities, other
than protection.
One of the desirable properties of matching is that under CIA we can invoke many of the
methods of inference used in a randomized experiment. Under pure randomization each selected
unit has an equal probability of being assigned to the treatment or control group. Therefore, under
the null hypothesis of no treatment effect there is a Pr = 0.5 that any unit within a pair chosen
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across treatment arms has a greater outcome than the other unit within the pair (outcomes are
“exchangeable” within pairs). In other words, under randomization, if treatment has no effect, we
should observe treated units within pairs exhibiting greater outcomes approximately 50% of the
time, and control units exhibiting greater outcomes approximately 50% of the time.27 If matching
satisfies CIA then similar logic, and inference, can be applied to matched pairs.
Suppose that matching perfectly accounts for all covariates that affect outcome and selection.
Similar to randomization, under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, we should observe
treated units exhibiting greater outcome values within matched pairs approximately 50%, and vice
versa. This type of inference is valid within matched pairs because, conditional on covariates X,
the probability of treatment within these pairs in equal and, therefore, outcomes within matched
pairs are considered exchangeable.28 Now suppose that there is some unobserved covariate, u, that
is uncorrelated with X, but correlated with outcomes Y and treatment T . There are two ways
of looking at the impact of u on inference: (1) u affects the probability of treatment such that
exchangeability is no longer satisfied, therefore, invalidating permutation-based inference using a
null of no treatment effect, and; (2) the differences in u, which are systematically related to T, are
driving the observed differences in Y, otherwise attributed to T.
Rosenbaum (2002) proposes measures by which we can test the sensitivity of our matching
results to the presence of u. Rosenbaum bounds allow us to measure how strong a confounder, u,
would need to be to the invalidate our statistical findings.29 In Rosenbaum’s model the probability
of assignment to treatment pij for unit j can be expressed in terms of odds as
pij
(1−pij) . Under
randomization pij = pik for j 6= k. Similarly, in an observational setting and in absence of u,
pij = pik when xj = xk. In other words, conditional of similar values of X within matched pairs, the
probability of treatment is equal for treated and control units. The departure from randomization
(or the influence of u), can be expressed by Γ in the odds ratio between matched pairs
1
Γ
≤ pij (1− pik)
pik (1− pij) ≤ Γ, for all j, k with xj = xk,
27Under randomization, there are a number of permutation-based inference tests by which to estimate exact p-values
based on this logic (e.g., Rosenbaum 2002).
28Another way of expressing this is that, conditional of X, there remains no other source of variation between
treated and control groups that affects Y , other than T .
29It should be noted prior to exposition that any measurement of sensitivity to unobserved bias, or varying degrees
therein, does not imply the presences of unobserved bias.
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where Γ = 1 under randomization. Conversely, if xj = xk but pij 6= pik this implies the presence of
u, the degree of which is captured by Γ 6= 1. For instance, if Γ = 2 (but xj = xk) this implies that
the presence of u is causing the odds of treatment between j and k to differ by a factor of 2. In
Rosenbaum’s sensitivity test we ask how large Γ would need to be (i.e., how strong a confounder u
would need to be) in order to alter matching-based inference.
To frame Γ explicitly in terms of the unobserved bias, u, Rosenbaum (2002) shows that the log
odds ratio for j is equivalent to
log
(
pij
(1− pij)
)
= k(xj) + γuj , with 0 ≤ uj ≤ 1,
which states that the odds of treatment are an unknown function of x plus an unknown parametriza-
tion of u.30 The odds ratio can therefore be rewritten as
pij (1− pik)
pik (1− pij) = exp{γ(uj − uk)},
where k(·) cancels when xj = xk. By stating the odds ratio in terms of u it can be seen that in the
absence of u, i.e., when u does not influence pi (or when uj = uk), e
γ = Γ = 1. Conversely, as the
influence of u increases (or as uj and uk diverge) Γ and the absolute difference in probability of
treatment between treated and untreated units increases.
In observational studies we cannot observe the presence of u or its potential influence as mea-
sured by Γ = eγ . In Rosenbaum’s sensitivity test we impose increasing levels of Γ to measure at
what influence of unobserved bias our inference would be invalidated (shown to be insignificant).
If inference is altered by a level of Γ close to 1 this implies that a study is sensitive to unobserved
bias. However, we reiterate that estimated sensitivity to unobserved bias in no way implies the
presence of unobserved bias.
A.6 Heterogeneous Impacts
One of the primary goals of the 1992 protected area restructuring was to empower affected commu-
nities by allowing for an integrated management strategy. Proponents of integrated management
30See Rosenbaum (2002) for a discussion of the restriction on u.
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argue that such a strategy is necessary for environmental goals to be achieved. Furthermore, by pro-
moting community involvement toward the achievement of environmental goals, one might expect
to see greater participation in the community at large and, therefore, greater poverty reductions in
communities surrounding protected areas that subscribe to an integrated management policy.
We test for differential poverty impacts in municipalities that were impacted by integrated
management protected areas (IMPA)31 using analyses similar to our primary specifications. Of
the 56 municipalities considered protected in the primary analyses, 18 are considered protected by
IMPAs. The genetic matching specifications return ATT estimates of -0.49 and -7.36 for PI and
NBI, respectively. These point estimates provide no evidence of a differential poverty reduction
in communities affected by IMPAs. However, the fact that both of these estimates are highly
significant (p-values of 0.0006 and 0.004, respectively) with such a small sample is indicative of the
consistency of poverty alleviating effects associated with IMPAs. In the end, such an analysis of
heterogeneity would significantly benefit from finer socioeconomic data. We believe that defensible
evidence of heterogeneity will only be obtained from community-level data, which will likely be
attainable in future work.
31Municipalities considered protected in these analyses had at least 10% of their area occupied by an IMPA.
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Figure A1: Map of municipalities congruent (orange) to a municipality with at least 10% area occupied by
a protected area (yellow).
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Figure A2: Histogram of propensity score distributions according to PI for full and matched datasets. Red
bars indicate frequency of unprotected units and blue bars indicate frequency of protected units (purple
represent areas where bars overlap).
Table A1: ATT Estimates from Primary GenMatch Specification by Protection Threshold
Poverty Index NBI
Threshold Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
5% -1.23 -0.761 -0.465 77.12 81.78 -4.66
[63] [63] (0.136) [60] [60] (3.394)
10% -1.33 -0.805 -0.525 76.18 84.16 -4.99
(Primary Specification) [56] [56] (0.142) [53] [53] (3.67)
20% -1.214 -0.725 -0.489 76.21 82.3 -6.075
[42] [42] (0.149) [39] [39] (4.75)
30% -1.162 -0.731 -0.431 76.64 82.92 -6.282
[38] [38] (0.154) [36] [36] (5.1)
50% -1.67 -1.223 -0.454 70.14 76.49 -6.35
[18] [18] (0.272) [17] [17] (3.52)
(Abadie-Imbens Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors)
[Observation]
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Table A2: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=5%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.23 -0.4946 -0.731 77.12 85.89 -8.77
in Means [63] [261] {0.0215} [60] [251] {0.004}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.42 NA NA -2.04
Marginal [63] [46] (0.103) [60] [42] (1.55)
Post-Match Frequency -1.23 -0.761 -0.465 77.12 81.78 -4.66
Weighted Regression [63] [63] (0.136) [60] [60] (3.394)
Genetic Matching -0.986 -0.516 -0.471 79.72 82.73 -3.01
[56] [56] (0.14) [54] [54] (2.09)
Genetic Matching, -1.07 -0.511 -0.56 79.04 81.51 -2.47
Calipers=1sd [49] [49] (0.147) [47] [47] (1.55)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
Table A3: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=20%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.21 -0.551 -0.663 76.2 85.3 -9.13
in Means [42] [282] {0.018} [39] [272] {0.013}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.527 NA NA -7.23
Marginal [42] [252] (0.113) [39] [242] (1.39)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.47 NA NA -2.83
Weighted Regression [42] [31] (0.116) [39] [29] (1.95)
Genetic Matching -0.996 -0.475 -0.52 78.95 82.48 -3.53
[36] [36] (0.155) [35] [35] (3.1)
Genetic Matching, -1.07 -0.511 -0.56 79.04 81.51 -2.47
Calipers=1sd [49] [49] (0.147) [47] [47] (1.55)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
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Table A4: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=30%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.16 -0.567 -0.595 76.6 85.2 -8.551
in Means [42] [282] {0.108} [36] [275] {0.029}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.523 NA NA -7.42
Marginal [38] [252] (0.119) [36] [242] (1.44)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.45 NA NA -2.91
Weighted Regression [38] [30] (0.124) [36] [28] (2.08)
Genetic Matching -1.162 -0.731 -0.431 76.64 82.92 -6.282
[38] [38] (0.154) [36] [36] (5.1)
Genetic Matching, -0.908 -0.506 -0.402 79.71 83.59 -3.872
Calipers=1sd [32] [32] (0.157) [31] [31] (3.1)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
Table A5: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Treatment Threshold=50%
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Nave Difference -1.67 -0.577 -1.1 70.14 85.01 -14.87
in Means [18] [306] {0.09} [17] [294] {0.04}
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.684 NA NA -11.3
Marginal [18] [252] (0.162) [17] [242] (1.95)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.627 NA NA -8.52
Weighted Regression [18] [15] (0.218) [17] [15] (3.3)
Genetic Matching -1.67 -1.223 -0.454 70.14 76.49 -6.35
[18] [18] (0.272) [17] [17] (3.52)
Genetic Matching, -1.23 -0.451 -0.782 75.9 82.22 -6.33
Calipers=1sd [15] [15] (0.245) [14] [14] (6.95)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
{P-value}
Table A6: Results from Placebo Matching Test
Poverty Index
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Genetic Matching -0.797 -0.84 0.044
Full Matched Sample [56] [56] (0.17)
Genetic Matching -0.915 -0.7189 -0.196
Dropped Repeat [41] [41] (0.156)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
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Table A7: Balance Results for Placebo Matching Analysis- Full Sample
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.‡ Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.319 0.834 -0.515 0.157 0.502
1992 Matched 0.319 0.264 0.054 0.016 0.216 89.48%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.466 0.148 0.317 0.531 0.315
Matched 0.466 0.458 0.008 0.012 0.035 97.51%
Distance to Unmatched 136600 102500 34100 0.205 33260
Major City Matched 136600 137500 -868.1 0.004 13100 97.45%
Average Unmatched 1794 2860 -1066 0.375 1052
Elevation Matched 1794 1936 -142 0.051 204.9 86.68%
Average Slope Unmatched 23.89 18.06 5.822 0.191 5.989
Matched 23.89 24.17 -0.287 0.008 4.508 95.07%
Roadless Unmatched 2.526E+14 6.101E+13 1.916E+14 0.259 1.860E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 2.526E+14 1.269E+14 1.257E+14 0.162 1.547E+14 34.38%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
Table A8: Balance Results for Placebo Matching Analysis- Unique Sample
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.‡ Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.282 0.834 -0.551 0.170 0.537
1992 Matched 0.282 0.283 -0.001 0.000 0.188 99.89%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.427 0.148 0.279 0.458 0.274
Matched 0.427 0.426 0.002 0.002 0.024 99.41%
Distance to Unmatched 136100 102500 33560 0.201 32230
Major City Matched 136100 132900 3230 0.017 10430 90.38%
Average Unmatched 1956 2860 -904.1 0.313 887.6
Elevation Matched 1956 2000 -44.070 0.015 147.3 95.13%
Average Slope Unmatched 23.62 18.06 5.556 0.181 5.591
Matched 23.62 23.03 0.594 0.017 3.361 89.30%
Roadless Unmatched 1.992E+14 6.101E+13 1.382E+14 0.212 1.265E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 1.992E+14 1.415E+14 5.764E+13 0.080 1.097E+14 58.28%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
Table A9: Spillover Analyses, Municipalities Congruent to Protected Municipalities Considered Treated
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.14 NA NA -3.12
Marginal [99] [153] (0.09) [95] [147] (0.98)
Genetic Matching -0.629 -0.726 0.097 81.7 83.88 -2.187
[99] [99] (0.185) [95] [95] (2.29)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
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Table A10: Balance Results for Congruent Spillover Analysis- PI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.‡ Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.678 0.787 -0.109 0.034 0.323
1992 Matched 0.678 0.616 0.062 0.019 0.331 43.27%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.319 0.113 0.206 0.355 0.208
Matched 0.319 0.311 0.008 0.012 0.020 96.30%
Distance to Unmatched 109000 107400 1569 0.009 10650
Major City Matched 109000 110500 -1567 0.009 9140 0.06%
Average Unmatched 2124 3095 -970.3 0.342 959.5
Elevation Matched 2124 2109 15.45 0.005 195.9 98.41%
Average Slope Unmatched 21.66 17.23 4.43 0.145 4.688
Matched 21.66 20.70 0.96 0.029 3.121 78.28%
Roadless Unmatched 7.926E+13 8.624E+13 -6.976E+12 0.009 3.20E+13
Volume 1992 Matched 7.926E+13 7.774E+13 1.524E+12 0.002 1.95E+13 78.15%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
Table A11: Balance Results for Congruent Spillover Analysis- NBI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.† Mean Diff.
NBI 1992 Unmatched 89.760 91.880 -2.114 0.049 1.957
Matched 89.760 90.560 -0.797 0.018 1.936 62.32%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.309 0.108 0.201 0.346 0.203
Matched 0.309 0.304 0.005 0.007 0.023 97.56%
Distance to Unmatched 109200 108200 1048 0.006 10110
Major City Matched 109200 107300 1894 0.011 7354 -80.79%
Average Unmatched 2158 3135 -977 0.348 965.8
Elevation Matched 2158 2137 20.97 0.008 167.7 97.85%
Average Slope Unmatched 22.08 17.75 4.332 0.141 4.579
Matched 22.08 22.72 -0.643 0.019 2.743 85.15%
Roadless Unmatched 8.04E+13 8.84E+13 -8.04E+12 0.010 3.26E+13
Volume 1992 Matched 8.04E+13 7.70E+13 3.43E+12 0.004 2.08E+13 57.36%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
Table A12: Results from Primary and Ancillary Analyses, Protected Areas Established in 1990s
Poverty Index NBI
Method Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment Y(T=1) Y(T=0) Treatment
Regression Dropping NA NA -0.599 NA NA -4.23
Marginal [32] [252] (0.128) [30] [242] (1.48)
Post-Match Frequency NA NA -0.54 NA NA -1.87
Weighted Regression [32] [24] (0.151) [30] [24] (2.09)
Genetic Matching -0.79 -0.313 -0.485 79.95 85.85 -5.89
[32] [32] (0.205) [30] [30] (5.38)
[Number of observations]
(Standard errors)
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Table A13: Balance Results for Analysis Using Protected Areas Established in 1990s- PI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.‡ Mean Diff.
Poverty Index Unmatched 0.552 0.744 -0.192 0.056 0.329
1992 Matched 0.552 0.563 -0.010 0.003 0.199 94.54%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.510 0.194 0.316 0.534 0.316
Matched 0.510 0.501 0.009 0.014 0.048 97.28%
Distance to Unmatched 175400 108000 67370 0.314 65140
Major City Matched 175400 145900 29480 0.123 41660 56.24%
Average Unmatched 1649 2713 -1065.000 0.373 1057
Elevation Matched 1649 1584 65.060 0.027 130.400 93.89%
Average Slope Unmatched 24.970 18.970 6.006 0.193 6.080
Matched 24.970 24.890 0.087 0.003 2.305 98.56%
Roadless Unmatched 3.825E+14 8.350E+13 2.990E+14 0.234 2.558E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 3.825E+14 2.808E+14 1.017E+14 0.061 1.632E+14 65.98%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
Table A14: Balance Results for Analysis Using Protected Areas Established in 1990s- NBI
Mean Mean Diff. Norm. Mean eQQ %Improve
Covariate Status Prot. Unprot. in Means Diff.† Diff.‡ Mean Diff.
NBI 1992 Unmatched 89.11 91.050 -1.934 0.043 1.821
Matched 89.11 89.130 -0.017 0.000 1.069 0.991%
% Forest 1991 Unmatched 0.488 0.187 0.301 0.510 0.298
Matched 0.488 0.483 0.006 0.009 0.036 0.982%
Distance to Unmatched 165600 108600 57030 0.271 54590
Major City Matched 165600 139400 26230 0.108 34620 0.540%
Average Unmatched 1731 2751 -1021 0.360 1013
Elevation Matched 1731 1746 -14.74 0.006 112.6 0.986%
Average Slope Unmatched 25.83 19.45 6.376 0.204 6.4
Matched 25.83 27.43 -1.602 0.045 3.239 0.749%
Roadless Unmatched 3.924E+14 8.528E+13 3.071E+14 0.234 2.600E+14
Volume 1992 Matched 3.924E+14 3.027E+14 8.969E+13 0.052 1.691E+14 0.708%
† Normalized difference in means is the difference in means divided by the square root of the sum of the
squared standard deviations of the treated and untreated covariate samples.
‡ Mean eQQ difference is the mean of the raw differences in the empirical quantile-quantile plots.
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Table A15: Regression Results from Primary Specifications
Standard Post-Match Weighted
Covariate/Outcome PI NBI PI NBI
(Intercept) -2.01*** -42.3*** -1.42*** -39.4
(0.157) (3.41) (0.288) (6.37)
Protected -0.535*** -5.62*** -0.494*** -2.63
(0.099) (1.2) (0.106) (1.7)
Baseline Poverty 0.896*** 1.26*** 0.927*** 1.31***
(0.017) (0.0361) (0.0235) (0.066)
Percent Forest 1991 0.574** 6.22*** -0.0298 -2.73
(0.192) (2.34) (0.302) (4.75)
Distance to Major City 2.77E-06*** -2.47E-05*** 2.22E-06*** 1.12E-05
(4.88E-08) (5.98E-06) (6.33E-07) (9.69E-06)
Average Elevation 1.95E-04*** -0.0035*** -4.51E-05 6.70E-04
(4.39E-05) (0.00054) (9.09E-05) (0.0014)
Average Slope -0.003 0.027 0.006 0.071
(0.0027) (0.032) (0.005) (0.074)
Roadless Volume 2.67E-17 1.96E-15* -7.78E-17 1.58E-15
(9.26E-17) (1.11E-15) (8.29E-17 (1.41E-15)
R2=0.918 R2=0.848 R2=0.951 R2=0.845
DF=300 DF=287 DF=89 DF=83
F=481 F=229 F=245 F=64.8
Notes: Outcomes are indicated at column heads and represent 2001 poverty index and NBI.
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.
(Standard Errors)
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